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Abstract. In the current restructuring phase of globalization, the geopolitical analysis, 
combined with the derived concept of geoeconomics, seems to acquire a new, growing 
interest. Specifically, the scientific discipline of geopolitics synthesizes the different 
socioeconomic analytical tools, having as final goal to propose and implement a proper 
strategy (geostrategy) by focusing on increasing national power and broadening the control 
of a geographic territory. In this context, this article explores how the contemporary 
geopolitical and geoeconomic analysis can valorize a composite evolutionary-dialectical 
method to enhance their understanding. To this end, substantial points of analytical 
enrichment to geopolitics and geoeconomics seem to emerge in the globalization’s 
restructuration era.  
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1. Introduction  
s scientific discipline, geopolitics was formed in the early 20th 
century and spread next into Central Europe during the interwar 
period (Lorot, 1995). The term geopolitics as scientific term was 
first applied by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1899), while 
the founder of geopolitical thought in Great Britain was Sir Halford 
Mackinder (1904; 1907), whose goal was to turn geography into a science 
that manages to bring together the natural and human sciences in order to 
enhance the ‚thinking imperially‛ idea. Mackinder also introduced the 
‚Heartland‛ theory, which hypothesized that the core of global influence is 
located in a region of the world in Eurasia (the Heartland) because of its 
size, wealth of resources, and large population. Consequently, Nicholas 
Spykman (1942) counter-proposed the ‚Rimland‛ theory, suggesting that 
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Eurasia’s rimland, the coastal areas, constitutes the key to dominate the 
‚world island‛ and eventually the whole world. In Germany, it was 
Friedrich Ratzel (1898) who first posed a geopolitical question for 
broadening the relationship between science and action. He established the 
school of classical political geography and defined the concept of 
‚Lebensraum‛ which was used massively later by the national-socialist 
propaganda. Subsequently, the works of his ‚student‛ Karl Haushofer 
(1932) had great impact to the Nazi leadership which used Haushofer’s 
ideas to justify German expansionism during the era of the National 
Socialist Party sovereignty. In the US, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) was the 
first that cultivated in his work the problem of geopolitics, specifying the 
need for a comprehensive geostrategic alliance between the United States 
and England to control the seas and which would provide defense against 
every hegemonic attempt in Europe and Asia. 
After the Second World War, geopolitics spent several years in a state of 
a relative ‚theoretical hypnosis‛. Also, after the end of Cold War two 
central arguments were put forward to support the end of geopolitics 
(Tuathail, 1997). First, how supposedly the new phase of global 
development is now removing geographical constraints and distances. 
Second, that under the influence of globalization’s dynamics, the 
establishment of increasingly integrated economic units -such as the 
European Union- leads individual states to practically lose several 
instruments of their national sovereignty and, therefore, their national self-
determination. 
Nevertheless, geopolitics and geoeconomics in our time seem to regain a 
new interest in the international scientific community. In the context of 
globalization, of course, modern geopolitics (Guiora, 2013; Newman, 2010) 
distinguishes itself from the classical pre-war geopolitics (Fettweis, 2015; 
Owens, 1999): it has structurally and conceptually revamped its analysis, is 
now more cautious against over-simplistic theoretical generalizations, and 
is increasingly trying to focus on the specific historical content of its subject. 
In this way, geopolitics constitutes now a canvas which synthesizes 
partial socio-economic analytical tools, with the ultimate goal to propose 
and implement proper strategies (geostrategy) and focusing on increasing 
national power and broadening the control of a geographic territory 
(Carroué, 2002; Chauprade, 2001; Foucher, 1991; Gottmann, 1973). 
Geopolitics, of course, implies and presupposes the existence of 
international antagonisms in various interdependent fields: military power, 
economic power (the basis of geoeconomics), demographic power, cultural 
power, environmental and all other possible forms of national power 
(Dodds & Atkinson, 2000; Huntington, 1996; Kagan, 2003; Taylor, 1985; 
Thual, 1996). Ultimately, contemporary geopolitics poses as central subject 
the study of interactions between the geographical space and the dynamics 
caused by antagonisms (Claval, 1996; Lacoste, 1976, 2012; Lévy, 2008). 
Therefore, geopolitics approaches the particular ‚space‛ as an expression 
and deployment framework of socioeconomic power, including 
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antagonisms in the control of strategic routes and networks, critical natural 
resources and also ‚symbolic‛ resources; geopolitics is conceptually 
articulated by interpreting all levels of space—from local to national to 
global (Krasner, 1983, 1999; Kunz, 2011; Mattli & Woods, 2009; Nye, 1990; 
Nye & Delorme, 1992; Pascallon, 2006). 
With respect to geoeconomics in particular, according to Sparke (2018), 
geoeconomy and other deriving terms constitute attempts to make sense of 
how geopolitical struggles and strategies relate to globalizing capitalism, to 
its economic remaking of territory, and to the market imperatives and 
cross-border geographical imaginations of contemporary globalization. 
Thus, in his view, the result is a confusing constellation of concepts that 
raise big questions about how capitalist economic imperatives and 
international relations shape one another, and how the geography of 
capitalism simultaneously makes and mediates these reciprocal relations. 
However, to what extent does modern geopolitical and geoeconomic 
thinking achieve a true evolutionary direction, avoiding the trappings of 
monolithicity, crypto-staticity and repetitiveness (Boschma & Frenken, 
2006; Uyarra, 2009; Zouboulakis, 2014)? To what extent can a dialectic 
perspective be used? And even deeper, how does dialectics relate to 
geopolitical thinking? 
• According to Sen (1975), the term dialectics connotes the 
simultaneous operation of diametrically opposite forces, positive and 
negative, as the driving factor behind the evolution of civilization. In 
this way, certain diametrically opposite forces operate simultaneously in 
global geopolitics and international relations. 
• According to Abdel-Malek (1977), several years earlier in the work 
entitled ‚Geopolitics and national movements: an essay on the dialectics 
of imperialism‛, it is argued that it is possible to describe the dimension 
of specificity as the endogenous dimension, while the dimension of 
geopolitics—the world system of power— as the exogenous dimension. 
Both are at play within each of the two elements, and are thus 
interwoven in a highly complex dialectics. 
• Tyner & Inwood (2014), in their work ‚Violence as fetish: 
geography, Marxism, and dialectics‛, conclude with respect to a new 
comprehension of violence that the concept of violence must be 
grounded in a socio-spatial dialectic that has its roots grounded in 
historical-materialist understandings. So, they choose a methodological 
direction where violence can be treated dialectically to move beyond the 
geographically confined and thread-bare narratives of ‚us versus them‛ 
to the more important and potentially transformative questions that 
constitute the multiplicity of subjectivities that are dealt with violently. 
• Lee et al., (2018) argue that while the formal distinction between the 
geopolitical and geoeconomic provides some methodological clarity and 
analytical purchase, ultimately these logics of power must be grasped 
dialectically: specifically, as a unity-in-difference, in order to provide a 
full geopolitical economic explanation. They add that other political 
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geographers provide rich discussions distinguishing geopolitics from 
geoeconomics but problematically fail to interrogate the dialectics 
between them and then needlessly argue for the priority of one over 
another. They conclude that Gramsci’s insight into the dynamics 
between class relations and the production of territory across different 
scales can contribute to a theory of geopolitical economy and territory 
that avoids these pitfalls while building on some of the best ideas that 
the discussions by geographers have produced. 
In this context, through the perspective of dialectical thinking, it seems 
that important points can emerge for the analytical renewal of geopolitics 
and geoeconomics within the study of modern world dynamics (Cerny, 
1990, 2010; Cooper, Hughes, & Lombaerde, 2008; Cox, 1987, 1997; Cox & 
Schechter, 2002; Duffield, 2007). In particular, the question posed by this 
article is whether the dialectical perspective can be used as analytical 
condition in contemporary geopolitical and geoeconomic analysis and 
strategy: in which direction and aspects of geopolitics and geoeconomics 
can we dialectically focus during the current restructuring phase of 
globalization? 
In order to achieve this aim, this article is structured upon the following 
steps: initially, we explore contemporary emerging trends in geopolitical 
and geoeconomic analysis that coexist with the current evolutionary-
restructuring phase of globalization. Next, we analyze the need to develop 
an effective geostrategy in the light of a dialectical perspective. Then, we 
explore the fundamentals of the dialectic method, while finally, we present 
the conclusions of our research by structuring a set of analytical proposals. 
 
2. Contemporary geopolitics and geoeconomics 
2.1. The revival era of geopolitics and contemporary geoeconomy 
Overall, geoeconomy studies the geoeconomic data of a geographic 
territory of national or international scale and which relate with the 
production/reproduction of spatial economic power. Specifically: 
• As a distinct branch of geopolitics, the creation of geoeconomics is 
generally attributed to Edward Luttwak (1993) and Pascal Lorot (1995, 
2001). Luttwak (1990, p. 17) suggested, in particular, that behind military 
conflicts and international trade the same logics are applied, arguing for 
the existence of a ‚zero-sum‛ game:  
‚The logic of conflict is ‘zero-sum’ since the gain of one side is the loss 
of the other, and vice versa. That is so in war, in geopolitical 
confrontations short of war, and in oligopolistic competition (as the 
market share of one oligopolist can only increase at the expense of 
another's); but not in a many-sided (‘perfect’)‛. 
• Cowen & Smith (2009), in their work entitled ‚After geopolitics? 
From the geopolitical social to geoeconomics‛ argue that geopolitics can 
be understood as a means of acquiring territory towards a goal of 
accumulating wealth, while geoeconomics reverses the procedure, 
aiming directly at the accumulation of wealth through market control. 
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To this end, they conclude that the acquisition or control of territory is 
not at all irrelevant but is a tactical option rather than a strategic 
necessity. And they explain how geopolitical calculation is always 
available when deemed necessary: insofar as there is a historical 
succession of sorts from geopolitical to geoeconomic logics of 
geographical power, therefore, this in no way represents a 
one‐dimensional, irreversible, evolutionary necessity. Ultimately, in 
their perspective, the rise of geoeconomic calculation is highly uneven 
temporally as well as spatially, it is episodic, and it can never fully 
supplant geopolitics. 
• Gasimli (2015) defines geoeconomics as the study of interrelations 
between economics, geography and politics in the infinite cone rising 
from the center of the planet Earth—apex, to the infinity of the 
universe—to the extent that this is possible. According to his approach 
geo-economics has three directions: a) ‚aironomics‛, which covers the 
infinity of the universe from the surface of the Earth and where the 
Earth’s air, moon, and other achievable bodies and space itself are the 
analytical objects; b) surface studies include land and water surfaces; 
‚undergroundonomics‛, which studies resources underground. 
• Jessop & Sum (2018), in their article ‚Geopolitics: Putting geopolitics 
in its place in cultural political economy‛, argue that geopolitical 
economy studies the economic, economically relevant, and economically 
conditioned in terms of—critical—political economy. 
Especially, in Luttwak’s (1998) geoeconomic perspective, nations are 
involved in antagonisms by, first, offering help or directly guiding private 
national actors and, second, by obstructing foreign trade interests. 
Specifically, nations support private entities by fostering Research & 
Development, by assisting foreign market penetration through investment, 
and by setting up protectionist policies for their domestic markets. He also 
notes that, as in the war, the ‚artillery‛ first conquers the ground by 
shooting, which can be then claimed by the ‚infantry‛: the goal here is to 
conquer future industries by achieving technological superiority. 
Nowadays, geoeconomics seems to progressively gain a prominent 
place in the field of geopolitical analysis. In this context, as early as in the 
end of Cold War, even Richard Nixon (1992, p.13) predicted that 
geoeconomic concerns could potentially replace classical geopolitics among 
US policymakers:  
‚Still others contend that, as the old war waned, the importance of 
economic power and ‘geoeconomics’ has surpassed military power 
and traditional geopolitics. America, they conclude, must beat its 
swords not into plowshares, but into microchips‛.  
Therefore, the ‚laws of geoeconomic gravity‛, including economic 
sufficiency and the existence of advanced and differentiated transport 
infrastructure, is of critical importance to a nation’s true sovereignty; to this 
end, investment attractiveness and ‚soft power‛ capacity across major 
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areas (such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative) are considered fundamental 
factors of geoeconomic power (Firzli, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
2.2. The restructuring of globalization and contemporary 
theoretical challenges 
In fact, a dense coevolutionary and codetermined network, which 
involves all of our world dynamics (economic, social, political, geostrategic, 
cultural, aesthetic, moral), lies now in the structural basis that defines 
reality (Gauchon, 2008; Strange, 1996) (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolutionary reproduction of the global geopolitical system 
 
Social evolution is now tied up to the development of all economies and 
societies on the planet, while every moment within globalization drives to 
the strengthening, deepening and sensitization of these evolutionary 
linkages. In other words, globalization constitutes the complex and 
coevolutionary phase of global economy (Asghar, Ali, & Mamoon, 2017; 
Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Freeman, 2019; Jaelani, 2016; Reich, 
1992): and, of course, the phenomenon of global economy exists since the 
beginning of human history and did not appear in our days ‚all of a 
sudden‛. 
In particular, the present phase of global economy (that is, globalization) 
is featuring a continuous widening and deepening of systemic 
interdependence. Globalization is not limited to narrow economic 
phenomena (trade, productive, consumptive, investment or financial), nor 
to ‚superficial‛ social phenomena of univocal ideological, cultural, 
aesthetic and communicative interpretation. On the contrary, globalization 
orchestrates and assimilates the interwoven complexity between social, 
economic, political and cultural developments within the socioeconomic 
systems (Gilpin, 2000). Therefore, globalization becomes gradually an 
indivisible and densely woven socioeconomic reality, which tends to 
extend across our planet. Globalization increases incessantly all the actors’ 
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and structures’ systemic engagement: on local, national and supranational 
level (Delapierre & Milelli, 1995; Fuchs, 2016; Michalet, 1985b; Peneder, 
2017). As T. Friedman (1999) noted several years earlier, the traditional 
boundaries today between politics, culture, technology, economy, national 
security and ecology disappear. Oftentimes, you cannot interpret one 
without another and you cannot refer to the whole by not referring to all its 
constituents. 
In this interpretive direction, we can argue that the ongoing 
restructuring phase of global crisis constitutes a distinct period in time 
where the balanced, healthy and unobstructed reproduction of the global-
scale socioeconomic gameplay is in doubt: not sporadically and 
conjuncturally, but structurally and in systemic terms (Amable, 2017; 
Bhattacharya, Khanna, Schweizer, & Bijapurkar, 2017; Vlados, Deniozos, 
Chatzinikolaou, & Demertzis, 2018). An increasing number of ‚players‛ 
cannot accomplish their previous goals and fulfill their ambitions; their 
past ‚behaviors‛ cannot work in their fields of actions; and their efforts to 
interpret the present and predict the future lead to several mistargetings.  
The current global crisis is an era when old problems seem to come back 
and get exacerbated, while new ones are emerging and spreading radically; 
in every corner of our planet, on an increasing number of cases, it seems 
impossible to find and implement viable and long-term solutions to these 
problems. Therefore, the global crisis seems a phase of simultaneous 
overturn of past certainties and reorientation of the global system as a 
whole (Doménech et al., 2007; Grinin, Korotayev, & Tausch, 2016; Imran, 
Alam, & Beaumont, 2014) (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Global crisis and restructuring. Adjusted from Βλάδος (2017). 
 
In this theoretical perspective, global crisis and restructuring nowadays 
seems to be the birth of multiannual structural maturation and incubation. 
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Like with every other evolutionary phase of global capitalism, the present 
crisis phase was the result of structural destabilization of the old 
development model (Adda, 2006; Aglietta, 2009; Amoore, 2002; Avant, 
Finnemore, & Sell, 2010; Michalet, 1985a; Pech & Adda, 2012), which was 
manifested drastically over the last ten years on a global scale.  
On the surface of events, when the subprime mortgage market collapsed 
(Gorton, 2009; Jacobs, 2009) there was a long chain of events that initiated 
and spread across the world, at all levels of our socioeconomic symbiosis. 
However, this crisis did not fall out of nowhere; it was rooted on the 
structural maturation of globalization’s previous development model 
(Boyer, 2013; Vlados, Deniozos, & Chatzinikolaou, 2018b): and, specifically, 
the maturity phase of globalization occurred during the past three decades 
(from the mid-80s to the mid-2000s). In this perspective, at the root of 
global crisis lies the dialectic between, on the one hand, the socioeconomic 
convergence and homogeneity (Cecilia de Burgh-Woodman, 2014; Palmer, 
2004) and, on the other hand, the incessant reproduction of divergence and 
heterogeneity (Ciderova & Repasova, 2013; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013): 
this is ultimately the pivotal qualitative characteristic of globalization.  
It becomes clear that all things change and evolve together. In this 
evolutionary context, the players, the structures and rules of globalization 
are tied up in a constant struggle for survival, prevalence and evolutionary 
redistribution of geopolitical power (Dalby, 2010; Elden, 2013; Terterov, 
Van Pool, & Nagornyy, 2010) (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Structures, behaviors, performances and restructuring in the global geopolitical 
system. Adjusted from Βλάδος (2017). 
 
In particular, within this global dynamics: 
1. Structures define the players’ limits of behaviors, while these 
behaviors define each player’s performances and, therefore, the 
dynamics of survival and reproduction.  
2. In case the players’ performances fall drastically and massively, 
putting into risk their survival and individual development, then the 
whole system is led to a crisis.  
3. The global system then seeks for and achieves under circumstances 
the necessary innovation -in broad socioeconomic and institutional 
terms (Vlados & Chatzinikolaou, 2019)- as an exit out of the crisis; this in 
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turn drives toward the restructuring of ‚structures‛ through a successful 
change management that opens a new cycle of development.  
4. To this uninterrupted process, every link in the ‚crisis chain‛ 
determines and is reversely determined by the dynamic global system. 
Therefore, the current reality is necessarily shaping a completely new 
environment for the contemporary geoeconomic thinking (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2016; Kurecic, 2015; Lenz, 2009; Mercille, 2008; Munoz, 2017; Scekic, 
Draskovic, & Delibasic, 2016): 
• Specifically, Leonard (2015) puts forward the questions  
‚What can the world’s states do to prevent geopolitics from 
unravelling the globalization of the world economy and its systems of 
governance and what are the main risks to industry/business and 
what can they do to mitigate them?‛ The author replies by proposing 
five thoughts: ‚1. States must develop their rules of the road for 
economic warfare. When governments use the infrastructure of the 
global economy to pursue political goals, they challenge the 
universality of the system and make it more likely that other powers 
will hedge against it ... 2. States must find the right economic role and 
pursue new forms of engagement. States need to find the right 
balance between ‚laissez-faire‛ and ‚intervention‛ to pursue strategic 
goals ... 3. Staying attuned to the ‚survival of the biggest‛ and the 
pooling of the weak. When a small country becomes too reliant on the 
regional powerhouse, its ability to pivot and maintain options for 
itself − economically and strategically − becomes limited ... 4. 
Businesses can keep their eye on the global prize but play by new 
rules in the interim. Business needs to pursue open globalization if it 
is to mitigate the risks posed by geo-economic competition and 
variables ... 5. A focus on key regional players and sub-global politics 
rather than worldwide institutions is necessary. Civil society needs to 
be more pragmatic about where it looks for solutions to global 
problems.‛ 
• In parallel, according to World Economic Forum et al., (2015, pp.4-
11):  
‚Geo-economics is both the antithesis and the greatest triumph of 
economic globalization. It is the overwhelming dependence of all 
countries on the global economy, which makes the threat of shutting 
them out so effective. And after two decades of coming together, 
many countries are focusing on the challenges of interdependence as 
well as on its benefits < map out the challenge of geoeconomics for 
companies, governments and campaign groups. It highlights the 
powerful trends reshaping the world, which are changing the rules for 
competition between countries and even the arenas in which these 
frictions play out‛. 
Ultimately, it seems that exiting the global system’s crisis requires a 
powerful leap of innovation. This must be built up and implemented at all 
levels in order for our world to enter the path of a new, stable model of 
global development (Onaran & Galanis, 2014; Perrons, 2012). And behind 
this necessity of drastic innovation, the problem of how the prerequisite 
new change management methodologies and mechanisms can arise 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
 C. Vlados, N. Deniozos, & D. Chatzinikolaou. JEST, 6(2), 2019, p.65-92. 
74 
74 
emerges, along with a deeper and completely new geostrategic perspective 
that will allow and make possible the exit from the crisis (Vlados, Deniozos, 
& Chatzinikolaou, 2018a). 
 
3. The issue of effective geostrategic articulation and 
dialectics 
Nowadays, there is also a deriving variety of geostrategic definitions, 
which generally attribute to geostrategy the role of applied geopolitical and 
geoeconomic analysis: 
• Grygiel (2006) states that geostrategy constitutes the geographic 
direction of a state's foreign policy and, more precisely, it describes 
where a state concentrates its efforts by projecting military power and 
directing diplomatic activity. It is argued that the underlying 
assumption of geostrategy is that states have limited resources and 
because of that they must focus politically and militarily on specific 
areas of the world. In this context, geostrategy describes this foreign 
policy thrust of a state and does not consider motivation or decision-
making processes. It is concluded that a state’s geostrategy is not 
necessarily motivated by geographic or geopolitical factors and that a 
state may project power to a location because of ideological reasons, 
interest groups, or simply the whim of its leader. 
• Sparke (2013) argues that geopolitics and geoeconomics can be 
analyzed as geographical representations of international relations that 
reflect the tensions of uneven development; in his view, this happens in 
ways that tend to abstract particular territorial problems or ideals out of 
the processes of historical-geographical transformation that produce 
them. 
• Wigell & Vihma (2016) note that economic forms of power 
projection are better included in the separate category of geoeconomics, 
whereby a typology emerges with two ideal-typical geostrategies, that 
is, geopolitics and geoeconomics. According to the authors, 
geoeconomics is about advancing geostrategic goals, but not mutually 
beneficial trade relations; therefore, geoeconomics can be defined as ‚the 
geostrategic use of economic power‛. 
• Inspired by the work of Harvey (1985), Sparke (2018) suggests that 
the external dialectic of geopolitics and geoeconomics can be understood 
as an over-determined expression of the internal uneven development 
dialectic in capitalism between spatial fixity and spatial expansion. And 
he adds that geoeconomics can be treated as the analysis of the relays 
between these internal and external dialectics. According to the author, 
to treat geopolitics and geoeconomics dialectically can highlight how as 
distinct geostrategic discourses they share common drivers in capitalist 
tendencies and contradictions; they tie together geostrategic discourse 
and practice in ways that reflect influential capitalist imperatives. These 
imperatives can help make the discourses and practices materially 
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consequential. However, he notices that beyond a crude base-
superstructure account of ideological formations associated with 
particular eras or world regions, a dialectical approach simultaneously 
can help to avoid two pitfalls that have undermined preceding theses 
about how geopolitics and geoeconomics relate to one another. He 
concludes that like a Scylla and Charybdis that imperil the analytical 
way-finding of geopolitical economy, these pitfalls involve, first, 
historically narrating geopolitics and geoeconomics into discontinuous 
eras and, second, geographically imagining them as strategic guides for 
distinct spaces of statecraft. 
Some of the interpretative approaches to globalization in the context of 
‚conventional‛ economic, political and management science remain still 
quite fragmentary and discontinuous. On the contrary, as we can see also 
from the branch of geostrategy, the questions that globalization put forth 
do not cease to become increasingly complex and acute. It seems that their 
‚quality‛ exceeds our perceptual abilities. This difficulty lies not only in 
terms of practice and action, but rather, in terms of perception, 
understanding and theoretical interpretation of everything that happens 
around us. Because without a coherent and comprehensive theoretical 
conception and approach of the socioeconomic phenomena that decisively 
shape our daily lives, our decisions necessarily remain merely reflective, 
with myopic, short-lived, sporadic and ultimately ineffective application. 
In geoeconomic issues, in particular, it seems that an effective 
evolutionary geostrategic perspective is missing. More precisely, according 
to the following discussion on the geoeconomics theme, we can see that a 
sufficiently coherent view of the phenomenon is still absent: 
• Cowen & Smith (2009, p. 38) argue that  
‚This Luttwakian vision of ‘geoeconomics’, while intriguing, relies on 
three problematic assumptions. First, the transition to a globalized 
geoeconomic world is not a matter of some natural evolution in 
economic affairs, but a case of active assembly, albeit fomented by 
very real scalar shifts in economic relations. Second, the geographical 
unevenness and radical incompleteness of this geoeconomic transition 
becomes clear when, in addition to finance and trade, one considers 
the constitutive globalization of production, and when the territorial 
implications of geoeconomic power are viewed at multiple scales. 
Third, geoeconomic calculation announced itself much earlier than the 
1990s. Geoeconomics was central to postwar neoliberal critiques of 
Keynesianism, on the one hand, and to postwar critiques of 
imperialism in the 1960s and 1970s, on the other < From the latter 
came a broader 1980s economic geography critique of capitalist 
restructuring at the global scale. The term itself seems to have been 
first used not by Luttwak but by French economic geographer Jacques 
Boudeville (1966) < who conceived 1960s liberal growth pole theory 
in terms of ‚geoeconomics‛, which he posited as an explicit 
alternative to geopolitics. This third historical critique is picked up 
here.‛  
• Vihma (2018, p.1) states that  
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‚There is a new wave of interest in the interplay between commerce 
and strategy, and ‘geoeconomics’ is again becoming a key concept in 
policy analysis. In the academia, however, since the emergence of the 
concept in the early 1990s, geoeconomic analysis has mostly been 
viewed through very critical lenses. Analysts have portrayed 
geoeconomics as simplified neorealism, as a neoliberal discourse, and 
as a securitisation project. This criticism of geoeconomics relies on an 
incomplete view of IR realism, as well as some oversimplifications of 
Luttwak, who introduced the term in 1990. This article underscores 
the relative property of Luttwak’s argument, in which economic 
means are gaining in importance in relation to military power, and 
countries are increasingly, but not always, turning to logic of conflict 
and geoeconomic policies. Luttwak also underscores the role of 
domestic politics and ideologies in determining whether a country 
engages in geoeconomic behaviour or not. The article suggests that 
strategic geoeconomic theory-building, inspired by but not limited to 
Luttwak, has much to contribute to our contemporary understanding 
of IR and geography, for example, in the analysis of strategy and the 
different power capabilities of states.‛ 
• Moisio (2018, p.22) responds accordingly, stating that  
‚In his article, Antto Vihma seeks to develop a geoeconomic approach 
that draws from Edward N. Luttwak’s conception of inter-state 
competition, and suggests that a more nuanced reading of Luttwak 
provides a way forward. In this essay, I first tease out and discuss 
Vihma’s arguments, before calling for the need to develop geopolitical 
analysis of contemporary geoeconomic processes. This kind of 
geopolitical analysis focuses on the political imaginaries that frame 
the world in terms of economic expansion, new kinds of inter-spatial 
competition, connectivity and pace or global integration and 
connectivity. These imaginaries have become increasingly salient in 
state-centric political debates on national interests, national security, 
and national identity.‛ 
• Subsequently, Vihma (2018b, p. 47) responds that  
‚Several scholars define geoeconomics in remarkably broad terms, 
covering an array of things: borderless economic zones, strategic 
economic instruments of foreign policy, both neoliberalism and 
economic nationalism, and so forth. Something is surely gained, but 
also lost, in developing the concept of geoeconomics towards this all-
encompassing direction. The risk is that the concept becomes overly 
extensive and loses its analytical power.‛ 
• Scholvin & Wigell (2018, p. 73) argue that  
‚Geoeconomics has become highly relevant for foreign policy 
practices and national security strategies, wherefore it has also started 
to receive increasing attention from academics. Unfortunately, there is 
no widely shared definition of geoeconomics. The term is often only 
used as a catchword that generates an audience for policy-oriented, 
semi-scientific outlets. This article addresses this weakness of the state 
of the art. The authors suggest that geoeconomics, as a foreign policy 
strategy, refers to the application of economic means of power by 
states so as to realize strategic objectives. As an analytical framework, 
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geoeconomics relates to international relations realism. Yet it 
transcends international relationship realism, as it is focused on 
geographical features that are inherent in foreign policy and 
international relations.‛ 
In practice, for our part, we appreciate that what is needed is an even 
deeper evolutionary and structural geoeconomic perception of the current 
restructuring phase of globalization (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Central methodological conflict in the study of global dynamics. Adjusted from 
Βλάδος (2017). 
 
4. Some essential methodological prerequisites for a 
dialectic apprehension of contemporary geopolitics, 
geoeconomics and geostrategy 
By studying the dynamics of globalization and the related geostrategic 
factors, we have reached the conclusion that it would be very difficult for 
anyone to perceive the contemporary geopolitical reality if has not been 
previously familiar with dialectics. For this reason, we propose the 
utilization of some evolutionary conceptions-methodological elements 
offered by dialectical philosophy in socioeconomic discussion (Bukharin, 
1931; Creaven, 2013; Jordan, 1967; Lenin, 1915; Magala, 1975; Marx, 1847; 
Pederson, 2015; Sanchez-Palencia, 2012; Thomas, 2009). In this way, we 
propose to enrich contemporary geopolitical and geoeconomic analysis 
through the lenses of dialectics, in the following nine directions which we 
think can act as analytical prerequisites for the ‚dialectization‛ of 
contemporary geopolitical and geostrategic thinking. 
 
Α. The dynamic and confrontational approach of phenomena… 
Everything alter and flow, as Heraclitus (Graham, 2009; Roy, 2018) used 
to say 3,000 years ago. And he was absolutely right. As time goes by, 
everything changes—and that is exactly the point in the dynamic approach 
of every phenomenon. This perspective of things is of paramount 
importance for us. To begin with, we have to understand that nothing 
relevant to whichever socioeconomic system in its entirety, in any country 
or even related to the entire global dynamics as a whole, cannot remain 
unaltered in time. In all kinds and levels of socioeconomic reality there is 
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nothing definitively consolidated and finalized once and for all. The only 
stable fact in our world is the constant change; the evolution of all 
situations. Even more, the situations of things themselves in their depth, 
are nothing more but silent constant evolutions, existing only as a façade of 
steady systems in their perpetual existence. 
Therefore, and in relation to any situation which occurs today as a 
‚stable equilibrium‛ in economy and society, we should be aware that it 
contains as well, from the very first time it existed, those ingredients which 
will lead to its evolutionary transcendence. Every apparently undisturbed 
balance is always, by design, doomed to succumb one day to the imbalance 
caused by the new opposing forces which, sooner or later, will arise, 
mature, and finally impose themselves. In reality, under every temporary 
balance there lies just a temporary silent underground conflict. 
 
B. Every equilibrium is always temporary… 
When on an object (either it is a simple physical object or any 
socioeconomic situation) act forces which balance and mutually negate one 
another, then, and only then, this object finds itself in a situation of 
temporary balance. Everyplace, though, incurs a constant conflict; under 
the ‚serene surface‛ everything move and convert. The balance which 
appears in any level of reality, sooner or later, gets unsettled and 
tumbled—and when restored will necessarily step on a new basis. 
However, this new balance will be once disturbed and will ultimately be 
replaced by a newer balance, which will frame the even newer balance. 
And as the today’s status quo is nothing more than the outcome of 
yesterday’s conflicts, in the same way tomorrow will necessarily be the 
figment of today’s conflicts; but also that tomorrow cannot last forever. 
Everything flows, all balances someday are overrun— apart from the 
change itself. 
Hence, we have to deal with—in the current globalization’s crisis, 
regarding all organizations—balances always temporary, always variable, 
and always fluid due to their deeper nature. Nothing is finished, in this 
dialectic flow, nothing is forever. 
So, everything changes and transforms as time goes by. That is why 
there can be no truly reliable examination of the phenomena in the absence 
of their dialectic approach and its deeper meaning—that is, without the 
study of their constant conflict and alteration through time, and the 
constant turnover of the existing balances they compose. 
 
C. Change and evolution… 
Eventually, no one can either prevent reality to evolve, or resuscitate the 
past. Of course, we need at this point some specifications to conceive more 
accurately the true essence of the concept of evolution. 
• To begin with, we should insist on the fact that every alteration is 
not necessarily evolution. Evolution is only the alteration which bears 
inside the force of quality transformation; meaning the deeper and more 
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crucial changes of the forces composing it. That is why we should 
always try not to equate impromptu the emerging superficial changes 
with the deep evolutions, not to emulate the circumstantial transitions 
with the structural transformations. This, for sure, most of the times, is 
not easy in theory, but it is eventually really important when trying to 
grasp the valid conception of globalization and crisis. 
• The second thing we have to clarify has to do with the main content 
of the notion of evolution, which often gets suppressed. In the core of 
socioeconomic phenomena, evolution always leads to destruction and 
creation at the same time (Schumpeter, 1942); it leads to the eradication 
of some obsolete ‚stems‛ of the past and to their replacement with new 
ones ‚full of life‛. 
• One third necessary clarification concerns the more specific way 
through which evolution unfolds through time; evolution never 
develops on a straight line. From time to time, though, it gives the 
impression that it is docile, that it just rediscovers and restores elements 
of the past, and that it just repeats itself cyclically and flatly. But, this is 
always an illusion. That alleged repeat of reality shows that it is always 
in depth a game of ascent. The evolution game is always played in a 
‚higher quality level‛ compared to yesterday, in a higher quality level of 
reality. We should perceive it as an irregular in pace (never relatively 
accelerated and never delayed) spiral course upwards—of course, ‚what 
is up and what is down‛ always remains a huge idealistic and 
philosophical question—and not as a repeated, flat, quiet circular orbit. 
• We reach, thus, a fourth necessary clarification. We should always 
insist on the need to realize the irreversible nature of evolution. None 
‚renowned past‛ can be repeated unaltered, none answer of yesterday is 
sufficient to fully reply today’s questions. So, whatever existed 
yesterday cannot return unaltered today. 
 
D. The dialectic development of all socioeconomic forms in the context of global 
dynamics… 
Using the term ‚socioeconomic form‛ we should never mean something 
elusive and vague. The term socioeconomic form is not an elusive word 
and void in content—it is exactly the opposite. Every collective social 
subject, every policy and action-maker is implemented historically in a 
socioeconomic form, which does not stop (cannot stop) evolving 
dialectically. Behind the change of every socioeconomic form lies steadily 
the sense of dialectic evolution. This path of thought of dialectic evolution 
was thoroughly perceived and molded by George Hegel (1807; 1812; 1837) 
(Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. The main schema of Hegel’s dialectical model of Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis. 
Reproduced from Βλάδος (2017). 
 
• Everything starts from a state of balance (always temporary, as we 
mentioned) which is called Thesis. This usually appears as the firm state, 
as the absolutely dominant reality. So, it launches its ‚reign‛ through a 
phase of development. Then everything ‚flourishes‛. 
• However, inside this Thesis emerges, sooner or later, the Antithesis 
to it. The balance starts to unsettle and gradually the ‚everlasting reign 
illusion‛ gets lost. Each Thesis always hides inside the seed of its 
Antithesis; it is just a matter of time for this Antithesis to emerge, to be 
emancipated and to be seen as a force to be reckoned with. 
Evolution never stops here, though. Through quantity accumulation, the 
growth of sizes, the enhancement of forces, the Antithesis itself does not 
stop to deepen, to build up, and to age. By this way, the Antithesis will 
manifest itself for the first time as a simple difference. Then will gradually 
escalate, to finally end up in direct conflict with the Thesis. Deep down, this 
constant growth of Antithesis is born, defined and headed by the existence 
of Thesis. 
That is why Antitheses can never exist separately. In fact, without 
Thesis, its Antithesis has no meaning and content; and respectively without 
Antithesis, a Thesis cannot exist. These two are undividedly and tightly 
tied in their gradually increasing conflict; in their escalated fight. A fight 
which contains elements of competition and cooperation at the same time 
(‚co-opetition‛ in Brandenburger terms; Asaro, 2011; Bengtsson & Kock, 
2000; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). Even if this fight usually projects 
the face of conflict, behind this projection a silent contract of consistency 
and, in depth, of co-creation does not cease to exist. 
So this is how the mutual unity and class of Antithesis becomes 
manifested. Ultimately, the inner cause of every evolution lies in this 
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endogenous contradiction of phenomena. That is to say the contradiction 
which is born in their interior. Next, the phase of crisis takes over and, 
inevitably, sometime the situation reaches a breaking point. ‚Nothing is 
right‛ anymore. Deep down, the accumulated quantity of the phenomenon, 
that is the escalation of the size, the degree, the intensity, the rhythm of the 
manifestation of the phenomenon, is the one which leads silently to the 
revolution of its quality. After all, every time that quantitative changes 
overcome some boundaries, then that is exactly the moment when the 
deeper structural balance of the phenomenon gets violated—that is when 
the quality of the phenomenon starts to change. 
Then, the quality—that is to say all its basic elements—its fundamental 
characteristics, what we name its Substance, has no other way but to 
change. That is exactly when a ‚new quality‛ emerges and a new boundary 
is established which will embrace the continuity of quantitative 
accumulation in the non-stop evolution of the phenomenon. Then the inner 
balance of the phenomenon—that is the relevant structural stability of the 
phenomenon or the action factor—proves that it has surpassed for good its 
yesterday’s boundaries. In other words, the balance in the frame of its old 
quality has definitely expired. There a qualitative leap occurs; a qualitative 
turnover in the growth of the phenomenon happens. And, deep down, the 
change in the quality of the phenomenon means its definitive 
transformation to something new. A completely new situation emerges 
here; a situation of qualitative accumulation which was borne gradually 
and silently. That is how something new comes through something old, 
surpassing and destroying it. And even deeper, that is how the continuity 
and discontinuity through the evolution of phenomena cannot but remain 
always tightly tied to one another. 
Finally, in the background, the escalated change of the content of the 
phenomenon leads to the radical alteration of its form. As a matter of fact, 
while the content of a socioeconomic institution, factor or phenomenon 
changes continually and gradually, its form, on the other hand, has the 
tendency to preserve and defend itself, until in some point of accumulation, 
suddenly and abruptly, it rebels and overflows, thus the phenomenon gets 
transformed: 
• Here a new era of balance is always born, built on a completely new 
qualitative base, which provides a new platform of quantitative 
accumulation of the phenomenon, which in the dialectic terminology is 
called Synthesis. 
• That is exactly how the denial of denial occurs: The previous conflict 
loses its point of existence and a new conflict is built in its Thesis. 
• The dialectic evolution will be continued, of course, by new 
Antitheses, by different level of phenomena, by different types of 
conflicts, by different players, by a different deeper strategy. The 
gradual further development of the content will always lead to new 
types and then to others and so forth; none of the socioeconomic types 
escape this fate. 
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Evermore, the quantities of accumulation lie behind the quality 
revolutions of the phenomena; therefore, we owe to study their unity, not 
only the quantitative but also the qualitative side of the evolution of each 
phenomenon; these two sides are always unbreakably tied to one another. 
Studying only the one side (either quantitative or qualitative) while 
ignoring the other, is always, deeply unscientific and steadily misleading. 
 
E. The “nothing really changes” and the historical claim… 
All those who claim that some historically distinct and structural 
different situations are, supposedly, one and the same thing, overrule the 
dialectic principles. Those who believe that the today’s globalization crisis 
has nothing different in relation to the state of global economy in the 
beginning of the 20th century ignore the dialectic evolution of things; they 
believe that globalization today brings nothing new and, thus, there is no 
point in using its concept. 
However, history never repeats itself; and when it seems so, it is nothing 
more than an elusive force. The game of globalization remains open and 
every easy conspiracy theory cannot be nothing more but pointless and 
misleading. So, everything changes in socioeconomic terms, whether we 
like it or not, and sometimes in a complete radical way. No matter how 
advanced our theoretical processing is, the evolution of reality comes, 
sooner or later, at least partially to surprise us.  
Nothing can be taken as definitely defined and steady forever in 
economy and society. Even if you wish to remain apparently the same—to 
simply look the same—you must constantly change. Otherwise, you 
deteriorate in comparative terms. The essential fact here is not if things 
indeed change—they certainly change and evolve in their core. The crucial 
question is what changes, how it changes, to what direction, in which 
depth, with what pace and why. 
 
F. The continuous overthrow of past balances and the solid connection of 
socioeconomic forces and phenomena… 
Even deeper, whatever happens today in economy and society does not 
balance on its own and in the absence of movement and co-action from the 
other factors—from the forces of its environment. Behind every status quo, 
constant conflicts among ‚hostile‛ and ‚allied‛ forces are hiding. All forces 
are deeply co-dependent and closely interwoven, always tightly linked to 
each other. 
There are divergent and convergent, synergic and clashing forces, which 
act together incessantly and are leveled temporarily even when we do not 
realize their deeper and silent conflict. When some of these correlated 
groups of forces are relatively strengthened and prevail over the rest, then 
the balance is unsettled and movement and alteration come forward. 
This state of constant overturn of the existing balances, which is 
expressed as a non-stop movement and alteration of a whole system of 
factors and forces, makes us perceive them eventually in their unity. The 
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forces when studied individually, outside their unity, outside their 
unifying frame, and outside their historic definition, lose their true essence. 
One such transgression will help us, eventually, understand the forces 
hiding behind socioeconomic phenomena which occupy us in their 
unbreakable union, in their special historical frame—not as divided, 
isolated or independent forces, but as a solid system of linked forces with 
specific reference in time and space. That is, as indelible and unified 
historic entities. 
 
G. The co-evolution of the individual dimensions of every socioeconomic 
system… 
This way, nothing relevant to the course of organizations in 
globalization can be tangible as absolute, isolated and independent 
phenomenon in its motion. The understanding of contemporary reality 
demands an ever-increasing co-evolutionary perspective. The evolution of 
all socioeconomic dimensions concerning every insertion and development 
—of whichever organization—in globalization is always bestowed on the 
basis of their unbreakable connection and correlation—in their systemic 
unity. When something changes in a system’s part, it drags down the rest 
of its components to change, to a greater or lesser extent. Every change, to 
some degree, leads to chain reactions, which we cannot bypass 
indifferently. 
In other words, we must not forget, not for a moment, that every 
confrontational balance in every organization or socioeconomic system is 
always molded in an unbreakable system of forces, factors and correlations. 
In a dense net of co-specifications and co-evolution. All apply together, 
necessarily. Thus, deep down, every socioeconomic system is an organic 
whole, an undivided set of co-defined and co-evolving parts, forces and 
factors. Nothing inside this, no dimension, is independent and detached 
from the rest. All together function and co-evolve, as far as this specific 
procedure of insertion and constant reintegration of each organic 
socioeconomic whole in the globalization is concerned. 
 
H. No temporary balance is autonomous and disconnected from the others… 
Therefore, we have to avoid every interpretation which exclusively 
focuses on the subtotal while loses the interpretation of the total—every 
interpretation of this kind is doomed to fail. The ‚fragmentary‛ is by nature 
misleading. That is to say, it always proves out to be inadequate and dead 
end, when you try to examine the specific problems of adjustment, 
individually and in terms of self-sufficiency. 
All socioeconomic junctions together compose a united and unbreakable 
net of evolving factors/interpretative dimensions. To understand the true 
point and perspective of each special interpretative dimension, of each 
explanatory link, of each analytic junction, you have to try to understand 
the whole chain, the construction and dynamic of evolution of the whole. 
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That is why the literature of globalization crisis nowadays lies in a crucial 
interdisciplinary theoretical-interpretative crossroads. 
To conclude, if we do not try to understand the reality of a 
socioeconomic system’s adjustment in globalization as a complete group of 
forces and factors, it is as if we have lost from the beginning the chance to 
realize all the dimensions of this adjustment. There are no partially reliable 
approaches and partial truths in the absence of a socioeconomic theoretical 
frame in understanding all the phenomena connected with globalization 
and its current crisis. 
 
I. The narrow co-evolutionary relation of the different socioeconomic systems 
and organizations, of every kind, in globalization’s crisis… 
We have to understand that every integration procedure of a 
socioeconomic system in globalization’s dynamics is materialized in a 
simultaneous dense network of movements and repositions. The course in 
globalization is not at all a self-centered game. Numerous socioeconomic 
systems and organizations align together, define and redefine incessantly, 
at the same time, this game and its rules. 
This way, it is never only one socioeconomic formation or only one 
organization which is called upon to adjust, instantly and forever, in 
globalization. All socioeconomic formations and all individual 
organizations adjust/readjust constantly in it. All together co-adjust, 
transforming evolutionary their position in this global dynamics. The 
evolution in globalization’s dynamics, thus, is a simultaneous and 
multilateral procedure connecting with an organic way different social 
systems and individual organizations which co-evolve; that is, systems 
evolving and growing together, like ‚living organisms‛, with rivalries and 
co-operations, with allies and hostilities, with common and different 
interests. 
So they gradually create a number of parts, elements and forces which 
are more and more connected and co-dependent through the evolution of 
the wider global environment. The partially different systems and players 
are unified evolutionary, the one goes inside the other and change together. 
All the socioeconomic systems and action-factors together create the 
evolving socioeconomic net of globalization; a net thicker and thicker, 
which keeps getting stronger in its connections. Every turbulence on this 
global net, in one of its parts, is inevitably transferred to the rest of its parts, 
disturbing, rearranging and retransforming them all, in a greater or lesser 
degree. And these turbulences, rearrangements and changes, later in time, 
return and change the total system of globalization itself. 
 
5. Conclusions and proposals  
In fact, following a direction of dialectical understanding of 
contemporary geopolitics and geoeconomics, we can avoid several frequent 
analytical ‚myopias‛ and misunderstandings, and in particular: 
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• The wrong impression of simple ‚conjuncture‛ of contemporary 
geopolitical power shifts; 
• The persistence in one-dimensional approaches that are unable to 
perceive thoroughly and synthetically the geopolitical evolution; 
• The occasional and fragmented approach of some geopolitical 
phenomena, outside of a comprehensive systemic approach. 
The pursuit of a state to achieve and maintain a privileged position in 
the global economy is a goal of geoeconomic strategy, following the 
geopolitical analysis of the components of power redistribution in the 
geographical, political and economic spheres. The geoeconomic analysis 
through dialectics is the framework that studies and predicts and describes 
the redistribution of power and, more generally, the systems of imbalanced 
power distribution in the international space. Geopolitics refers to the ‚is‛ 
while geostrategy constitutes the ‚must be‛. So when it comes to the 
geoeconomic perception of geopolitics, we explore the relationship 
between the economic power of the geographical area and the ‚artificial‛ 
space in which the liquidity and intensity of economic transactions make it 
increasingly difficult to identify territorial borders. 
Our previous findings also help us to better understand the concept of 
the current crisis of globalization, its structural, historical and evolutionary 
perspective, where its deeper subversive content can be traced. More 
generally, the exploration of the current structural crisis and the 
restructuring of globalization (Guttmann, 2015; Yokokawa, 2013), in socio-
economic terms, we always expect to be based on the following 
assumptions: 
1. The crisis refers always to complex, organic-type systems: A simple 
system, a simple ‚machine‛, never comes into crisis; it simply presents a 
‚corrective malfunction‛ (Venette, 2003). 
2. The crisis always bears a necessarily restructuring content: The post-
crisis situation cannot be assimilated to the previous state of affairs. 
3. The crisis has always an urgent character: it must be dealt with as 
quickly as possible because the overall systemic stability and viability of 
the system is at imminent risk and any delay often bears drastic 
structural consequences. 
4. The crisis rarely destroys directly the affected system: It reduces, 
however, drastically—and often in a rapidly deteriorating way—its 
operational effectiveness in achieving its previously defined goals 
(Mitroff & Silvers, 2010). 
5. The crisis has always an evolving character: it is not limited to 
certain functions. It extends—either explicitly or implicitly—through 
‚metastases‛ on all sides of the system-organism; and 
6. The crisis is, ultimately, a ‚physiological phase‛ in the evolution of 
each organism/system: It can lead to death or create the necessary 
conditions for renewal, eliminating its inadequate, diseased or dead 
‚cells‛. It is not a pleasant phase, but it is an evolutionary phase: The 
treatment of it always requires a radically renewed way of 
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